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C
ompared with the pace of structural
reforms in Latin America aimed at liber-
alizing product and capital markets,
labor reforms have been scarce. In many
instances, when they have occurred,
they have increased the level of regula-
tion in labor markets. However, it is often argued that
without further labor market reforms aimed at dereg-
ulating labor markets, labor market performance will
not improve and Latin American economies will not
be able to compete in international markets. But how
do regulations in Latin America compare to those
found in other parts of the world? What types of
reforms are necessary? Is dismantling the current lev-
els of regulation and protection the way to go? 
This paper assesses labor market regulations in
Latin America and briefly documents their recent
history. It then examines the costs and benefits that
such regulatory systems exact on labor market per-
formance. I argue that while existing labor market
regulations generate costs in terms of labor market
performance, they constitute the base (albeit imper-
fect) of social protection policies in Latin America.
Since the demand for social protection appears to be
large, reforms that seek only labor market deregula-
tion do not address this demand. Because the possi-
ble benefits of the current regulatory systems (or
possible alternatives) have not been well measured,
a proper cost-benefit analysis of any proposed
reforms cannot be made; further research in this area
is imperative to avoid the pitfalls of poor reforms.
While it is tempting to conclude that the solution lies
in designing and implementing better social protec-
tion mechanisms that reduce the costs exerted by
the current system, the alternatives are not exempt
from costs and are not warranted to improve upon
existing systems. In these circumstances, a mix of
research, policy experimentation and policy evalua-
tion can help provide a solution to these dilemmas. 
The Regulation Debate
T
he debate on regulations and reforms is fed by
the fundamental question of whether the labor
market needs regulations. From the point of view of
neoclassical economic analysis, with the right set of
conditions in place, labor markets by themselves and
without intervention would be expected to deliver
efficient outcomes. According to this view, regula-
tions are the result of political pressures that have
little to do with improving the functioning of labor
markets. It is argued that even if the purpose of regu-
lators is to achieve positive social outcomes (for
example, redistribution of income from employers to
workers or from one type of workers to another),
labor markets operating according to such a rule will
malfunction, delivering high unemployment or dis-
criminating against certain types of workers, thereby
undoing the positive effects intended by the law.
Of course, whether this scenario holds true and
dismantling all forms of regulation is the right reform
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Labor Regulations and Labor Reforms in 
Latin America
A
cross countries, labor market regulations aim
at improving the welfare of workers, regulating
aspects such as pay (minimum wages); benefits and
conditions of employment (vacations, medical
leave, maximum number of hours worked); social
security contributions and benefits; job security;
and collective bargaining agreements. This paper
restricts its attention to the costs and benefits of
conditions of work, social security, and job security
regulations, leaving the analysis of the effect of
other regulations for future work.
Latin American countries started regulating their
labor markets at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.1 The Mexican constitution of 1917 articulated
the principle that protecting workers was one of the
duties of the state. By the 1930s and 1940s most
countries had a labor code. Up until the early eight-
ies successive reforms expanded the protection that
the law afforded to workers. In the eighties, the debt
crisis facilitated the emergence of a new policy con-
sensus around economic liberalization; however,
the path of reforms since then does not show a
clear trend toward labor market deregulation. For
instance, since 1985 restrictions on hiring and firing
became more stringent in some countries and less
stringent in others. Similarly, while many countries
moved from pay-as-you-go to individual-accounts
social security systems, strengthening the link
between contributions and benefits, payroll contri-
butions increased in many countries.
Working conditions and social security regu-
lations. Labor laws regarding working conditions in
Latin America are protective by international stan-
dards. Figure 1 provides a comparison of an index of
conditions of employment in world regions and Latin
American countries. Higher values of the index indi-
cate a greater number of employment regulations and
more protective regulations for workers. The index
captures what is written in the laws and regulations
of each country on the maximum number of hours
in a workweek, overtime work, night shifts, holidays,
hours of work, maternity leave, other types of leave,
and vacation days.2 It should be emphasized that this
is a de jure indicator. That is, it does not reflect
whether these regulations are enforced; it only mea-
sures conditions according to the letter of the law. 
Surprisingly, less developed countries have more
statutory working conditions than industrial coun-
tries do. Latin America is surpassed only by Eastern
Europe and Central Asia in its level of de jure protec-
tion of workers. Within Latin America, the labor codes
of Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Panama provide the
depends on whether labor markets are expected
to deliver efficient outcomes without intervention.
In an ideal situation where many workers compete
for comparable jobs and many firms compete for
comparable workers and where insurance and
credit markets allow workers to diversify the risk
of unemployment, regulations would be of little
effect and would most likely worsen labor market
performance. But labor markets, particularly in
developing countries, do not much resemble this
ideal scenario. The market for private unemploy-
ment insurance is plagued with adverse selection
and moral hazard problems, and therefore private
unemployment insurance is generally not avail-
able. Consumption credits to unemployed workers
are generally not available either. This situation
implies that workers are forced to sustain periods
of job loss with their own savings, borrowing from
friends or family, or sending inactive household
members to search for jobs. Because many work-
ers do not have the resources to sustain periods of
productive job search, they may be forced to
accept the first job that comes their way because
they cannot afford to remain without income. In
this scenario, workers may not have the resources
to move to where the jobs are, reducing the com-
petition for jobs and workers in the labor market
and shifting the balance of bargaining power to
firms. In addition, because workers do not have
the time to search for jobs that match their abili-
ties, the qualities of the matches in the labor mar-
ket may be very low, reducing current wages and
the incentives to invest in training or technology
that brings future productivity gains. 
This argument makes it clear that there may be
costs and benefits to regulations and that therefore
the right approach is not to discuss when or how to
deregulate. Instead, the discussion must be based
on which set of institutions and regulations will
improve the functioning of labor markets and
whether the regulations that are already in place
achieve their goals or instead need to be amended.
While existing labor market regulations gener-
ate costs in terms of labor market performance,
they constitute the base (albeit imperfect) of
social protection policies in Latin America.1. Lindauer (1999) brings attention to the fact that Latin American countries started regulating labor markets much earlier in
their development process than industrial countries did. 
2. See Botero et al. (2003) for more on calculating this measure.
3. This index is the normalized sum of the following components: the difference between retirement age and life expectancy;
months of contributions required for normal retirement to qualify for health and unemployment insurance programs, if avail-
able; contributions to pensions, disability, health, and unemployment insurance programs; the replacement rate for pensions;
the replacement rate for health insurance benefits; months of contributions to qualify for health insurance benefits; and the
waiting period for health insurance benefits. 
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most protective working conditions to workers while
Jamaica, Uruguay, and Chile have the least protective
regulations. Across the world, regulation of employ-
ment conditions tends to be more protective in coun-
tries that are poorer and in those with a legal system
based on French civil law (Botero et al. 2003).
In contrast, social security benefits (and contri-
butions) are lower in Latin America and other devel-
oping countries than in industrial countries (see
Figure 2). The social security index is the sum of
three indexes summarizing benefits received from
old age pensions and health, maternity, and unem-
ployment insurance programs.3 The index takes a
greater value for programs with greater benefits
and for those with greater benefits relative to con-
tributions. According to this measure, social secu-
rity regulations are less protective of workers in
Latin America than in other industrial countries and
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
However, the index for Latin America is higher than
for other developing regions, including East Asia.
Within Latin America, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Peru
have the lowest social security benefits whereas
Colombia, Panama, and Argentina have the highest
level of protection, with levels that are above the
average in English-speaking industrial countries.
During the nineties many countries implemented
reforms that transformed pay-as-you-go systems
into full or capitalization systems. However, many
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FIGURE 1
Conditions of Employment Index (0–1)
Source: Botero et al. (2003)70 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
sure is a normalized sum of the following four dimen-
sions of protection: (1) whether employment at will
is allowed and whether termination for economic
reasons is considered a fair cause for dismissal,
(2) procedures that an employer must follow and
approvals it must seek prior to individual or collective
dismissals, (3) advance notice and severance pay-
ments, and (4) whether job security is enshrined in
a country’s constitution. In Figure 3, Latin America
and the Caribbean is the world region with the most
job security. English-speaking industrial countries
have the lowest levels of statutory protection. Within
Latin America, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil exhibit
high job security according to this measure, and
Uruguay, Jamaica, and Chile have low job security. 
Heckman and Pagés (2003) provide an alterna-
tive measure of job security regulations across indus-
trial and Latin American countries. The measure
includes advance notice, severance pay, and contri-
butions to mandatory individual savings accounts.5
Other costs, such as those associated with consul-
tations with the authorities prior to collective dis-
missals, are not considered. While this is a less
complete measure of employment security, it pro-
vides a measure of the level of benefits awarded to
Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil—increased the level of
payroll taxes to reduce the actuarial imbalances that
characterized most systems prior to the reforms and
that became more acute once contributors ceased to
pay for the pensions of retired workers. 
Job security regulations. One of the objectives
of labor laws in Latin America is to promote job
stability. They do so by mandating minimum
advance notice periods, specifying which causes
justify dismissal, and mandating severance pay in
case of dismissal. Labor codes also limit or forbid
the use of contracts that can be terminated at no
cost (such as temporary contracts). In some cases,
labor codes require firms to be involved in lengthy
consultations with the authorities prior to undertak-
ing collective dismissals; in other cases, workers can
be reinstated to their post if a labor court judges the
cause of separation to be unfair. These provisions
constitute the most important mechanism to insure
workers against the risk of unemployment since in
Latin America traditional unemployment insurance
mechanisms, as found in developed countries, are
either not available or are underdeveloped.4
Botero et al. (2003) elaborate a measure of job
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Social Security Index (0–3)
Source: Botero et al. (2003)4. Only a few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Barbados) have unemployment
insurance (UI). Moreover, the coverage and replacement rates are very low. For instance, Argentina introduced a new UI pro-
gram in the early nineties, but in 2003 only between 3 and 4 percent of the unemployed received this benefit (Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares [EPH] 2003 from INDEC). 
5. In a number of countries in Latin America, labor codes mandate firms’ periodic contributions to workers’ individual accounts.
The funds deposited in these accounts plus interest income can be withdrawn only in the event that a worker separates from
a job either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
6. Another advantage of this measure is that it records time variation in regulations during the nineties. 
7. In contrast, in many countries reforms to labor codes made hiring workers under temporary or fixed-term contracts easier,
effectively lowering the cost of dismissing a worker. 
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workers in case of separation.6 Figure 4 summarizes
the ranking of countries and the changes in regula-
tion recorded by the Heckman and Pagés measure
for Latin American countries during the nineties. It
shows that dismissing a worker in Latin America
involves a larger mandatory transfer to the worker
than it would in industrial countries. The ranking of
countries is somewhat different when job security is
compared according to this measure. At the end of
the 1990s, firms in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador
had the highest mandatory transfers to workers,
and dismissed workers in Nicaragua, Paraguay, and
Uruguay received the lowest benefits. Mexico, which
ranks as highly protective according to Botero et al.
(2003), appears relatively flexible in the Heckman
and Pagés measure because a large part of employ-
ment protection in Mexico comes in the form of
lengthy procedural requirements rather than a high
mandatory transfer to workers.
Contrary to common belief, employment protec-
tion for permanent workers did not weaken in most
countries in the 1990s.7 In Chile, Brazil, and the
Dominican Republic, at the beginning of the 1990s
and later in Nicaragua (1996), reforms aimed at
restoring the political balance after military regimes
produced more protective labor regulations. In
Chile, in 1990 a new law increased maximum
indemnities from five to eleven months of pay. It
also reintroduced the need for firms to prove just
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The Cost of Job Security, End of the Eighties Relative to End of the Nineties 
Note: Cost of job security includes advance notice, indemnities for dismissal, and seniority pay.
Source: Heckman and Pagés (2003)
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regardless of the cause or the party that initiated
separation. These benefits were converted into an
individual mandatory savings account, greatly
reducing the costs associated with providing this
benefit.8 In addition, the reforms eliminated the
right to reinstatement for workers with more than
ten years of tenure. However, reforms also increased
the cost of indemnities for dismissal. 
In 1991 Peru reduced the cost of dismissing
workers hired under indefinite contracts. During
the 1971–91 period, Peru had an extremely protec-
tive labor law that granted permanent job security
to workers. From 1991 onward, workers hired after
that year could be dismissed upon payment of a
severance benefit. Indemnities for dismissal were
reduced in 1991 and then again in 1995; however, in
1996 they increased again. 
In other cases, reforms increased one component
of the transfer and reduced another. In Panama
(1995) and Venezuela (1997), reforms simplified and
reduced indemnities for dismissal but considerably
increased the additional amount that firms had to
pay as severance pay. 
In summary, at least on paper, Latin America is
well endowed with laws and regulations aimed at
other countries, the new law considered the eco-
nomic needs of the firm a just cause.
Brazil enacted a new constitution in 1988 that
enshrined new benefits and expanded existing ones.
The new constitution also modified the mandatory
individual savings accounts system created in 1966.
Prior to the reforms, the law required employers to
deposit 8 percent of employees’ wages in a worker-
owned account. In case of separation, workers could
withdraw the accumulated funds (plus the interest
rate). In addition, if a firm initiated a separation it
had to pay a penalty equivalent to 10 percent of the
amount accumulated in the account. As part of the
1988 reform, this penalty was increased to 40 per-
cent, considerably increasing the cost of dismissing a
worker. The penalty was further increased to 50 per-
cent, and the monthly contributions were raised from
8 to 8.5 percent in the year 2001.
In contrast, in Colombia and Peru, labor market
reforms reduced the total amount of the transfer
to be paid to workers. In 1990 Colombia reformed
many aspects of the labor code. Among the most
important changes were the reform of the cesan-
tias, or mandatory pay, that firms have to provide
workers at the end of the work relationship8. The high cost of operating this benefit derived from the fact that workers could make early withdrawals against this benefit.
But while the pay was indexed to the last wage prior to separation, withdrawals were credited against the severance pay with-
out adjusting for inflation. High inflation made this system costly.
9. The data are gathered from various sources. Employment and unemployment rates and unemployment duration in Latin
America were computed directly from individual countries’ household survey data. For industrial countries the source is labor
force statistics from the OECD, available online at <www.oecd.org>. Real GDP per worker was obtained from Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2002). GDP per capita is the time average between 1995 and 1999, and the source is World Bank
Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2000. Employment growth data for Latin America was obtained from ILO and for indus-
trial countries from the OECD. Self-employment rates for Latin America were computed directly from individual country
household surveys. For industrial countries the source is Blanchflower (2000). The regulatory measures are obtained from
Botero et al. (2003) and Heckman and Pagés (2003).
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improving the welfare of workers. In many aspects,
lawmakers in Latin America have gone above and
beyond the levels provided in other countries, and
there have been few reforms aimed at bringing reg-
ulations in line with those in other countries. What
is the cost of the status quo? What are the benefits?
Which reforms, if any, should be implemented?
The Costs of Regulations
T
he cost of working conditions and social
security regulations. Regulations are manda-
tory transfers from employers to employees. The
effect of such regulations on labor market outcomes
depends on who effectively bears the cost of such
transfers. Thus, regulations do not necessarily imply
an extra cost for employers or a disincentive to hire
labor; such costs depend on whether employers are
able to transfer the costs to workers in the form of
lower pay. Thus, regulations that mandate benefits
for which workers have a high willingness to pay can
increase the welfare of workers without affecting the
labor market while regulations or benefits for which
workers have little desire will lead to loss of jobs. In
addition, if minimum wages or other wage floors pre-
vent the adjustment of wages, regulations that in
principle could be neutral might reduce employment
and increase unemployment. Similar regulations may
have different effects across countries because of
interactions with other regulations. 
One simple measure of the impact of regulations
is to correlate measures of regulations with mea-
sures of labor market outcomes. While such results
should not be interpreted in a causal fashion, they
give an indication of whether countries with more
stringent regulations are associated with better or
worse labor market performance. I gather data for
labor market outcomes and for regulations for a
sample of Latin American and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries and run simple cross-country regressions
to correlate regulations to outcomes.9 Since the
level of development of a country is correlated with
performance, this analysis controls for per capita
gross domestic product (GDP). The regulatory data
are dated in 1997 (Botero et al. 2003) or in 1999
(Heckman and Pagés 2003). The outcomes are
computed as the time averages for the periods
reported in the first row of Table 1. The results
reported in the table suggest that more protective
working conditions are correlated with higher self-
employment and higher duration of unemployment
(although this latter coefficient is significant only at
the 11 percent level). The magnitude of the effect is
large. For instance, an increase in the generosity of
the conditions of employment from the 10th (low-
est) percentile to the 90th (highest) percentile is
associated with a 6.58 percentage point increase in
self-employment and a 16.55 point increase in the
percent of long-term unemployment. Instead, there
is no statistical association between conditions of
employment regulations and employment or unem-
ployment rates. This pattern would seem to suggest
that the increase in self-employment is exactly
compensated for by a decline in wage employment
with no aggregated employment losses. 
Instead, the results suggest that social security
contributions are correlated with lower employ-
ment rates and lower employment growth across
countries. The correlation with unemployment is
positive but not statistically significant, suggesting
that losses in aggregate employment result in peo-
ple withdrawing from the labor force rather than
declaring themselves unemployed. However, higher
social security benefits are correlated with a higher
percentage of long-term unemployed workers (one
year or more). This correlation is consistent with a
picture in which higher contributions and benefits
lead to lower job creation and greater difficulty in
finding jobs. There is no evidence, however, that
higher social security contributions lead to higher
self-employment rates. The costs in terms of employ-
ment rates and employment growth suggested by
these cross-country regressions are not small. An
increase in social security contributions from the
10th percentile to the 90th implies a 4.63 percent-
age point loss in employment rates using thePercent 
unemployed
Real GDP reporting
Dependent Employment Unemployment Employment Percent self- per worker, duration of
variables rate rate growth employeda growth rateb more than a year
Conditions of employment (index 0–1)c
Coefficient –7.24 3.12 –2.53 12.67 1.35 31.83
t-statistics (1.27) (0.67) (1.21) (2.40)* (0.89) (1.64)
No. of observations .54 .39 .40 .33 .83 .38
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.75 0.03 0.11
Social security (index 0–3)c
Coefficient –3.61 1.02 –1.77 –0.87 –0.30
t-statistics (1.62) (0.71) (2.31)* (0.29) (0.71)
No. of observations .54 .39 .40 .33 .83
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.7 0.02
Social security contributions (as percent of wages)d
Coefficient –12.48 3.86 –3.16 –0.08 1.64 73.04
t-statistics (1.97) (0.93) (2.14)* (0.01) (0.79) (4.51)**
No. of observations .42 .36 .32 .38 .42 .40
R-squared 0.18 0.12 0.29 0.7 0.17 0.39
Job security (index 0–1)c
Coefficient 0.60 –0.64 1.67 0.77 0.49 –3.45
t-statistics (0.10) (0.18) (0.80) (0.16) (0.35) (0.20)
No. of observations .54 .39 .40 .33 .83 .38
R-squared 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.7 0.02 0.05
Job security (as multiples of monthly wages)d
Coefficient –1.38 –0.97 0.32 –0.36 0.17 –0.15
t-statistics (1.37) (1.52) (1.08) (0.36) (0.67) (0.47)
No. of observations .42 .37 .32 .38 .41 .42
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.71 0.34 0.12
a Blanchflower (1996) and IDB based on household surveys
b Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)
c Botero et al. (2003)
d Heckman and Pagés (2003)
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient, t-statistic, number of observations, and R-squared of regressing outcome measures on a constant
and regulations, controlling for GDP per capita. Only one regulation at a time is included in the regression. The absolute value of t-statistics
is shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. The employment
rate is employment per population, mean 1995–2001; the unemployment rate, mean 1995–2001; employment growth, number of employ-
ees, mean 1990–2001; percent self-employed, mean 1995–2001; real GDP per worker growth rate, mean 1995–99; and percent unem-
ployed reporting duration of more than a year, mean 1995–2001.
Sources: Employment and unemployment data for Latin American countries from IDB (2003) and from OECD Labor Force Statistics for
OECD countries
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TABLE 1
The Costs of Labor Laws and Regulations: Regression Results10. Gruber (1994) for the United States and Gruber (1997) for Chile find that workers bear all the costs. Edwards and Cox-
Edwards (2000), Mondino and Montoya (2000), and MacIsaac and Rama (1997) find that the cost is shared by employers
and employees. 
11. A worker is defined to be covered by labor market regulations, or, in other words, to hold a regulated job, if he or she is affil-
iated to social security through his or her job. 
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Heckman and Pagés (2003) social security measure
and a 6.73 percentage point loss if the Botero et al.
(2003) social security measure is used instead. 
While these correlations are suggestive, they are
based on a limited number of countries and observa-
tions. Some other studies provide results based on
more disaggregated data, longer time horizons, and
methodologies that control for unobservable omitted
factors. For example, Heckman and Pagés (2003)
survey the existing literature on the effects of
mandatory benefits and social security contributions
on wages and employment. They conclude, “All in all,
the available evidence for Latin America suggests
that at least part of the cost of non-wage benefits is
passed on to workers in the form of lower wages”
(36). A few studies find evidence that workers pay
for the entirety of benefits, but the majority find that
employers bear a share of the cost.10 Heckman and
Pagés (2003) also estimate the direct impact of social
security contributions on employment using a panel
of countries in the OECD and Latin America. They
find that such contributions reduce employment and
increase unemployment both in the joint sample and
within each region. Therefore, the evidence is quite
robust that although benefits are partly paid by
employees, mandatory benefit regulations have a cost
in terms of employment. 
Another issue that is particularly relevant in the
context of low- and middle-income countries with
poor enforcing mechanisms is that if lawmakers go
beyond what workers are willing to contribute in
order to achieve some benefits, workers might
exchange lower protection for higher net wages.
Excessive protection may partially explain why com-
pliance with social security regulations is low (see
Figure 5). Fifty percent or more of employees are not
covered in Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican
Republic, and El Salvador.11 Excessive protection
may also explain why in Latin America it is less likely






























Percentage of Salaried Workers without Social Security Benefits, End of Nineties
Source: Author’s computations from individual country household surveysArgentina Brazil Bolivia Costa Rica
2001 1999 1999 2000
Gender
Male 66.34 64.71 34.86 80.18
Female 60.69 63.57 40.80 85.19
Education
No school n.a. 35.36 n.a. 65.01
Primary incomplete 37.36 46.13 15.11 69.30
Primary complete 50.31 59.21 5.46 75.36
Secondary incomplete 50.59 60.88 22.48 81.35
Secondary complete 71.69 81.80 40.48 91.76
At least some tertiary 79.61 88.64 61.51 96.70
Activity
Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing n.a. 31.91 5.98 74.42
Mining & quarrying 86.04 67.99 n.a. n.a.
Manufacturing 66.86 78.79 29.43 86.36
Electricity, gas & water supply 86.03 94.25 n.a. 94.62
Construction 31.96 41.93 11.68 57.62
Whole & retail trade; hotels & restaurants 52.76 67.50 24.41 81.75
Transport, storage 57.17 78.18 17.08 79.74
Finance, insurance & real estate; 
business services 79.79 86.94 n.a. 89.80
Community, social & personal services 80.83 65.26 64.12 86.91
Age
Aged 15–24 44.06 49.56 12.20 69.68
Aged 25–49 68.95 70.62 45.27 85.82
Aged 50–64 67.25 65.36 49.73 87.60
Zone
Urban 63.93 67.50 38.54 85.02
Rural n.a. 44.00 26.22 78.06
Family
Head 71.44 70.09 43.46 87.00
Spouse 64.24 66.77 57.92 86.39
Son, daughter 54.67 56.51 19.00 75.08
Other relatives 54.71 55.90 n.a. 77.68
Other nonrelatives n.a. 51.40 n.a. 74.86
Domestic workers n.a. 69.08 n.a. n.a.
Firm size
1–5 25.78 1–5 37.77 1–4 12.26 1–5 58.67
6–15 57.80 6–10 62.07 5–19 14.22 6–9 72.50
16–50 81.57 >10 85.43 20–49 42.24 10–19 82.47
51–100 87.60 50–99 61.51 >19 94.99
>100 92.38 >99 72.08
Multiples of minimum wage
Less than 90 percent 50.41 11.65 10.58 74.65
90–120 percent 25.96 41.18 13.39 88.58
121–200 percent 45.39 60.03 16.68 93.01
201–300 percent 65.45 73.61 28.79 93.47
301 percent and more 77.26 83.66 55.67 85.57
Source: Computed by author from household surveys in each country
TABLE 2
Percentage of Salaried Workers with Social Security by Category






























1–5 52.32 1–5 16.45 1–5 8.17
6–9 70.34 6–15 46.03 6–10 27.46
10–49 79.55 16–50 74.90 11–50 49.81
50–199 86.58 51–100 85.94 51–100 65.17
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than middle- or higher-income workers. Excessive
protection may also explain why younger workers
(who are likely to be covered by the contributions of
other members of the household) are less likely to be
covered than older workers.12 Table 2 shows that
social security programs protect a lower percentage
of young, unskilled, and lower-wage workers than
men and older, skilled, and richer workers. Thus, not
only is coverage low, but it is also biased against those
workers that arguably need more protection.
The cost of job security. Cross-country regres-
sions of the two job security measures discussed
earlier against a set of indicators of performance,
controlling for income per capita, do not provide
much evidence that job security regulations are sig-
nificantly correlated with measures of performance.
However, given the limited number of countries
involved in this study, it is important to rely on stud-
ies that make use of longer time series or a larger
number of countries. Below, I summarize the results
of this growing literature.
Effects on turnover. At the aggregate levels,
turnover rates and job security regulations tend to
show no correlation. Figure 6 plots average turnover
rates and the Botero et al. (2003) job security mea-
sure across a sample of OECD countries and two
Latin American countries.13 The economic litera-
ture has proposed some explanations for this sur-
prising lack of correlation. For instance, Bertola and
Rogerson (1997) explain the similar rates of job cre-
ation and destruction found in continental Europe
(rigid) and the United States and Canada (flexible)
by arguing that countries with high job security are
also likely to have institutions that promote wage
rigidity. Loboguerrero and Panizza (2003) provide
evidence that supports this argument because
countries with more stringent job security regula-
tions have larger employment losses associated
with cyclical changes in economic activity. 
Yet it is very likely that crude measures like gross
job flows do not control for the size of macroeconomic
12. An alternative explanation is that younger, less skilled work-
ers tend to be employed in firms that evade labor laws; how-
ever, it could be argued that such firms do not pay because
they are not able to pass the cost on to the employees.
13. Job turnover is the sum of the job creation and job
destruction figures for a given year. Job creation is com-
puted as the percent increase in employment at the plant
or establishment level for all plants whose employment
increased between one year and the year before, weighted
by each plant or establishment’s employment. Job destruc-
tion is computed in a similar manner. A job turnover rate
of 25 percent indicates that one in four jobs is created or
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hiring in good times. This effect implies that even if
the cost of severance pay and other job security
provisions could not be fully shifted to workers,
employment rates may not decline because reduced
hiring could be outweighed by reduced layoffs. In
fact, the empirical evidence on the effect of job
security on employment and unemployment rates is
far from conclusive. Addison and Teixeira (2001)
survey the literature for industrial countries and
report that while a large group of studies find a neg-
ative effect of job security on employment, others
do not. The evidence on the effects of job security
on unemployment is equally ambiguous. 
Heckman and Pagés (2003) review the literature
for Latin America and find that while some indi-
vidual country studies suggest that regulations
promoting job security reduce employment, cross-
country time series estimates for Latin American
and OECD countries do not show those results. The
strongest results are found by Saavedra and Torero
(forthcoming) for Peru and Mondino and Montoya
(forthcoming) for Argentina. In both studies, the
authors find that lower job security is associated
with higher industrial employment rates. However,
studies examining labor reforms in Chile and Brazil
find no evidence of statistically significant effects.14
Thus, although some studies suggest that reduc-
ing job security in Latin America holds the promise
shocks or other relevant differences across economies
that may be important in determining turnover. Some
recent studies suggest that, controlling for these differ-
ences, job security affects turnover in the expected
way. For instance, Kugler (forthcoming) finds evidence
for Colombia that job instability increased after labor
market deregulation and that this change occurred
across all sectors and not only in the tradable sectors
(as would be expected if these changes were mostly
caused by contemporaneous trade reforms). Micco
and Pagés (2004) provide a formal test of the causal
relationship between labor market regulations and job
turnover once relevant differences across countries are
controlled for. This test is based on the notion that
more volatile industries should be more affected by
strict employment protection than less volatile indus-
tries are. The results suggest that employment protec-
tion reduces turnover, particularly in industries that
are more volatile or require less specific human capital. 
Effects on employment and unemployment. In
some respects, job security regulations can be inter-
preted as mandatory benefits, so the former analy-
sis on the impact of these benefits also applies to
job security provisions. However, job security regu-
lations differ from regular mandatory benefits in
that these regulations specifically seek to alter
firms’ decisions regarding hiring and firing workers.
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Source:  Botero et al. (2003) for the job security index and IDB (2003) for annual gross job flows14. See Pagés and Montenegro (1999) for Chile and de Barros and Corseuil (forthcoming) for Brazil. 
15. See Nickel and Layard (1999) and the references therein. 
16. See Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001). See also the extensive literature on reallocation
and productivity growth summarized in Davis and Haltiwanger (1996).
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of higher employment and lower unemployment
rates, others do not. These results may imply that
the effects of labor market deregulation differ
across countries, depending on the circumstances
accompanying such reforms.
Duration and composition of employment.
Two areas in which job security regulations are
found to have important and undesirable effects are
the duration of unemployment and the composition
of employment by age, gender, and skill. The evi-
dence suggests that more stringent job security
provisions tend to increase the duration of unem-
ployment. This pattern is explained by a decline in
hiring rates. As firms become more reluctant to hire
workers (for fear of expensive dismissal costs in the
future), unemployed workers have greater difficulty
finding new jobs.15 For Colombia, Kugler (forthcom-
ing) finds that after a reform in 1990 that reduced
job security, the average duration of unemployment
declined from its prereform levels. 
The evidence also suggests that job security pro-
visions create winners and losers. In a study of
OECD countries, Nickell (1997) reports that while
job security does not seem to have an effect on
prime-age male employment rates, it is associated
with lower employment rates for women and youth.
Two studies of Chile (Pagés and Montenegro 1999;
Montenegro and Pagés, forthcoming) find that job
security provisions are not neutral across age and
skill groups. More stringent job security regulations
are found to bias employment toward prime-age
and older workers while reducing the employment
share of younger workers. Moreover, higher
employment protection is associated with a relative
decline in the demand for unskilled workers relative
to skilled workers. The effects are quite sizable. For
instance, a 10 percent increase in job security
reduces the employment rate of young, unskilled
workers by almost 0.5 percentage points. For
skilled youth, the effect is smaller but still signifi-
cant. For older workers, these effects are reversed
and employment rates increase with job protection.
To give an idea of the magnitudes, the 1990 Chilean
reform increased job security by about one-third.
The estimates suggest that this reform could have
reduced the employment rate of unskilled youth by
1.5 percentage points. 
Productivity growth. Perhaps the most worri-
some claim against job security regulations is that
they might reduce productivity growth. The argu-
ment is that they reduce the reallocation of workers
from less productive to more productive activities.
In countries such as the United States, such reallo-
cation accounts for more than half of the productiv-
ity growth rate.16 Yet while the evidence indicates
that job security slows down reallocation, the rela-
tionship between labor market institutions and
growth is far from conclusive. Nickell and Layard
(1999) examine the effect of job security provisions
on productivity growth in a panel of OECD coun-
tries and conclude that there is no evidence in their
sample that countries with more stringent job secu-
rity have lower labor (or total) productivity growth.
This result is driven by the fact that in the period
considered in their study (1976–92), countries like
the United States, Canada, and New Zealand, which
are characterized by low job security, had lower
average productivity growth than countries like
Spain, Italy, and Belgium, which have high job pro-
tection. Scarpetta and Tressell (2002) analyze a panel
of countries, sectors (manufacturing and services),
and years. They find that although on average coun-
tries with higher job security tend to experience
lower productivity growth, this effect is statisti-
cally significant only in countries with intermediate
levels of coordination/decentralization in collective
bargaining. They interpret these findings as sugges-
tive that job security provisions do not have nega-
tive effects in countries where incentives for firms
to train existing workers are high (as is the case in
countries with coordinated/centralized collective
bargaining) or in countries that have few restrictions
on hiring the required mix of skills in the market
(decentralized bargaining). 
In sum, the existing literature points to sizable neg-
ative effects of mandatory benefits and, in particular,
Contrary to common belief, employment pro-
tection for permanent workers did not weaken
in most countries in the 1990s.80 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
social security contributions on employment. More-
over, while the effect of job security provisions on
employment or unemployment is ambiguous, such
provisions do seem to make labor markets more
sclerotic (characterized by less job creation, lower
job flows, and longer duration of unemployment)
and bias employment against young and unskilled
workers. The effects of labor market regulations on
productivity and growth remain an open question. 
The Benefits of Social Protection
W
hile labor market regulations generate costs in
terms of labor market performance, the demand
for social protection appears to be large. Rodrik (2001)
cites a large cross-national survey of fourteen Latin
American economies that found that almost 75 per-
cent of the respondents favored higher spending on
unemployment insurance while 80 percent favored
more spending on pensions.17 Another cross-national
opinion survey covering seventeen countries in Latin
America indicates that, on average, more than 20 per-
cent of the survey respondents name unemployment
as the most pressing problem in the region. In some
countries, such as Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Nicaragua,
and Argentina, the percentage of respondents that
identified unemployment as their main problem
surpassed 30 percent (Latinobárometro 2001). More-
over, according to the same survey, 85 percent of
the respondents were either unemployed or worried
about losing their job. In comparison, workers were
more anxious about losing their jobs in Latin America
than in industrial countries despite the fact that
turnover rates are comparable across regions (IDB
2003, chap. 2). These differences could be attributed
to the lower levels of protection against unemploy-
ment in Latin America once the low compliance with
regulations is factored in. 
This discussion raises the question of what the
benefits of current levels of regulation are. While
research attempting to measure the costs of regula-
tions has grown substantially in the last ten years,
research measuring the welfare effects of labor
market regulations in Latin America has been very
limited. Gaviria (2001) suggests that poorer house-
holds are more likely to cope with income shocks by
cutting back on human capital investments than
richer households are. Yet it is unclear whether
such arguably inefficient strategies could be
reduced if poorer households had better access to
social insurance. In this regard, there is hardly any
research assessing whether the level and design of
existing provisions cover the needs of beneficiaries.
This assessment is particularly relevant because
mandatory provisions like pensions, health benefits,
or unemployment insurance can crowd out private
savings, within-household transferences, spousal-
added worker effects, or other informal insurance
mechanisms, thus reducing the overall effect of reg-
ulations.18 Are the high levels of insecurity driven
by the low levels of coverage or by design failures in
the current social protection systems? The survey
data reported in Rodrik (2001) suggest that there
are no substantial differences in the level of insecu-
rity across income or education classes. This evi-
dence is quite surprising given the strong correlation
between income and coverage suggested by the
figures reported in Table 2. 
One of the few studies analyzing the consumption-
smoothing effects of labor market regulations is
MacIsaac and Rama (2001). In this paper, the
authors assess the impact of employment protec-
tion clauses, and, in particular, mandatory sever-
ance pay, on consumption in Peru. The study finds
that consumption among unemployed workers
receiving severance pay was 20 to 30 percent greater
than among those who do not, suggesting an impor-
tant consumption-smoothing role of such provisions.
However, the study also finds that consumption
among those unemployed workers that received
severance pay was higher than among employed
workers. This finding suggests that severance pay
might be too high for beneficiaries and too low for
everybody else.
Recent economic literature emphasizes the value
of social insurance not only in its consumption-
smoothing role but also as an instrument to bring
aggregate productivity gains by promoting better
job-worker matches. Marimon and Zilibotti (1997)
show that in economies with unemployment insur-
ance, unemployment increases more in bad times
but wage inequality grows less and productivity
grows more as a result of better job-worker matches.
Similarly, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000) argue
that unemployment insurance can increase pro-
ductivity by encouraging workers to seek higher-
productivity jobs and by encouraging firms to create
More stringent job security regulations are
found to bias employment toward prime-age
and older workers while reducing the employ-
ment share of younger workers.17. The original source, as quoted by Rodrik (2001), is Mirror of the Americas Poll, Wall Street Journal.
18. See, for instance, Engen and Gruber (1995) and Cullen and Gruber (2000) for estimates of the effects of unemployment
insurance on precautionary savings and on the spousal-added worker effect, respectively. 
19. See IDB (2003, chap. 2). The original data sources are Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) (Argentina, 1993–2001)
elaborated by Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos de la Republica (INDEC) and Encuesta Nacional Empleo Urbano
(ENEU) (Mexico, 1990–2001), constructed by Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI).
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those jobs. The evidence for Latin America suggests
that many workers might be liquidity constrained in
their search for productive work. Table 3 presents
six-month labor market transition matrixes for
Argentina and Mexico, by gender and age, computed
with longitudinal panel data.19 The data show that
while women and youth have a lower probability of
transiting from unemployment to employment
within six months than men and prime-age workers,
women and youth tend to find better jobs. They, for
instance, are more likely to find jobs that pay bene-
fits mandated by labor laws. In Argentina, out of 100
youth transiting from unemployment to employ-
ment, 23.4 find jobs with social security benefits
while the corresponding percentage for prime-age
workers is only 19.3. In Mexico, the respective per-
centages are 41.8 versus 37.2. In Mexico, prime-age
women are also more likely to find jobs with benefits
Prime age Prime age
From unemployed to… All Prime age Young Male Female Skilled Unskilled
A. 1993–2001, Metropolitan Buenos Aires, Argentina
...Unemployed 36.2 34.4 37.6 37.9 31.1 37.6 32.7
...Inactive 26.9 24.8 27.5 8.4 40.8 23.9 25.4
...Employed 36.9 40.8 34.9 53.7 28.1 38.5 41.9
...Owner 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.2 0.9
...Self-employed 27.9 32.2 13.6 36.3 24.5 27.0 35.5
...Wage worker 71.3 66.8 85.8 62.9 74.0 71.8 63.7
...Small firms 60.4 61.5 51.0 61.7 61.2 47.5 68.5
...Medium firms 22.2 19.7 28.4 20.8 17.6 23.5 18.0
...Large firms 17.4 18.8 20.6 17.5 21.2 28.9 13.5
...Job with benefits 18.8 19.3 23.4 19.3 19.3 31.1 13.3
...Job without benefits 81.2 80.7 76.6 80.7 80.7 68.9 86.7
B. 1990–2001, Urban Mexico
...Unemployed 15.4 15.3 15.9 16.3 14.2 18.3 13.3
...Inactive 30.0 24.6 34.0 7.9 47.5 25.1 23.9
...Employed 54.6 60.1 50.1 75.8 38.3 56.6 62.8
...Owner 2.4 3.6 0.7 4.6 0.9 4.0 3.3
...Self-employed 15.7 22.0 6.8 24.0 17.2 19.7 23.4
...Wage worker 81.9 74.3 92.5 71.4 81.9 76.2 73.4
...Small firms 44.0 46.6 38.7 49.0 40.9 36.2 53.3
...Medium firms 20.2 18.0 23.0 18.0 17.7 18.7 17.4
...Large firms 35.8 35.4 38.3 33.0 41.4 45.1 29.3
...Job with benefits 38.5 37.2 41.8 35.8 40.1 42.7 33.5
...Job without benefits 61.5 62.8 58.2 64.2 59.9 57.3 66.5
Source: Panel A, IDB (2003) based on EPH (1993–2001) from INDEC; panel B, IADB (2004) based on ENEU (1990–2001) from INEGI
TABLE 3
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deregulate but whether the benefits of the current
system of regulations are outweighed by the costs
or whether there are alternative systems that
improve upon the existing ones. The balance
between benefits and costs and the opportunities
for improvement is bound to change from country
to country, depending on the design and level of
existing regulations. Murillo (2003) finds that in
Latin America those countries that had more strin-
gent labor market regulations in 1985 were more
likely to deregulate their labor markets during the
nineties while the least regulated countries tended
to reregulate. This finding suggests that in highly
regulated countries, the costs of such regulations
tended to outweigh their benefits. In the future,
more research is required on the costs and particu-
larly on the benefits of the current regulatory sys-
tems or on proposed reforms. This task is urgent.
The failures of the current regulatory systems are
many, and the costs they exact on labor market per-
formance are substantial. Yet the hazards of poorly
conceived reforms should also not be forgotten. 
It is tempting to conclude that the solution lies in
designing and implementing better social protec-
tion mechanisms that reduce the costs exerted by
the current system while expanding the coverage of
the system. Yet it should be clear that the alternatives
are not exempt from costs and are not warranted to
improve upon existing systems. The deregulation of
temporary contracts and the conversion of manda-
tory severance pay in unemployment insurance
illustrate the pitfalls of reforms.
During the nineties, many countries deregulated
the use of special contracts with limited duration
and no severance payment obligations. However, to
prevent firms from hiring only temporary workers,
temporary contracts can be renewed only a limited
number of times, after which workers have to be
hired under permanent, regular contracts.20 This
type of reform was thought to be inferior to a full
deregulation (that is, reducing the cost of dismissing
all workers) but still considered an improvement
upon the situation of no reform. Yet the available
research is starting to show the downside of these
reforms. Deregulating temporary contracts increases
rotation because firms hire more workers at the
entry level, employ them for a while, and then dis-
miss them without giving them permanent jobs to
avoid the costs associated with indefinite contracts.
Employment rates do not necessarily increase (or
unemployment rates decline) because the effect of
more workers hired is outweighed by the effect of
increased layoffs (Blanchard and Landier 2002;
Hopenhayn, forthcoming). As the probability that
than men are while they are equally likely to do so
in Argentina. Women and youth are also more likely
to find jobs as wage employees and in large firms.
While it is unclear that all wage employees are better
off than self-employed workers, it is a well-known fact
that wages tend to increase with the size of the firm. 
The longitudinal data also show that workers dis-
placed from unregulated jobs suffer higher wage
losses upon reemployment than workers displaced
from regulated work (see Table 4). Considered
together, these findings indicate that those workers
who can sustain a longer or more effective search
process—either because they are likely to be sup-
ported by other members of the family or because
they received severance pay—find better jobs. This
evidence suggests that severance pay or unemploy-
ment insurance benefits might bring substantial
productivity gains both for the beneficiaries and for
the economy as a whole. In that regard, the low lev-
els of compliance with the current system may be
limiting consumption-smoothing and productivity
gains for a large share of the labor force. Yet com-
pliance is not an exogenously given variable that is
solely determined by the effectiveness of the state.
As described earlier, inadequacies in the level and
design of current labor market institutions may be
driving people away from social insurance.
The Pitfalls of Reforms
T
he former discussion argued that while exist-
ing regulations exact costs on labor market
performance, and possibly on overall economic per-
formance, it is often forgotten that such provisions
serve a role. Yet the value of such provisions is not
well known. There seems to be a large and unmet
demand for social protection despite the fact that
the level of protection for beneficiaries is quite high.
This high demand raises two issues. The first is
whether the current system of regulations does
what it is supposed to do to the (minority of) peo-
ple that it reaches. The second is that the appropri-
ated discussion is not so much how or when to
Workers were more anxious about losing their
jobs in Latin America than in industrial coun-
tries despite the fact that turnover rates are
comparable across regions.Argentina Mexico
Aged 50 years or older 17.5 Aged 50 years or older 16.2
Aged 30–49 years 5.9 Aged 30–49 years 26.3
Aged 20–29 years 9.7 Aged 20–29 years 16.8
Female 2.6 Female 8.3
Male 10.8 Male 17.7
Tertiary complete 26.5 Tertiary complete 35.9
Tertiary incomplete 44.5 Tertiary incomplete 21.6
Secondary complete 14.1 Secondary complete 21.1
Secondary incomplete 4.0 Secondary incomplete 15.4
Primary complete 4.8 Primary complete 10.2
Primary incomplete 24.8 Primary incomplete 14.0
Without social security 10.3 Without social security 20.8
With social security 5.3 With social security 9.2
Different sector 16.3 Different sector 15.5
Same sector 3.5 Same sector 14.9
Source: IDB (2003) based on EPH-Argentina (1993–2001) and ENEU-Mexico (1990–2001)
TABLE 4
Average Wage Loss of Displaced Workers Relative to Nondisplaced Workers (Percent)
20. These types of new modalities were introduced in Argentina in 1991 and extended in 1995. Peru and Colombia also lifted
restrictions on the use of these types of programs in the early 1990s. In both cases, the number of workers hired under these
modalities increased enormously—for Peru, from 20 percent of salaried employees in 1990 to 55 percent in 2000, and in
Colombia, a similarly high increase. In Brazil, the use of such contracts was deregulated in 1988.
21. For example, according to household survey data from Uruguay (Encuesta Continua de Hogares) in 2002, approximately
25,000 people declared themselves to be receiving unemployment benefits, and more than half of them were employed.
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workers are converted to permanent status declines,
so does the incentive to accumulate human capital
or provide training. Since temporary contracts tend
to be concentrated among young workers, incen-
tives for productivity growth are reduced for those
workers who need them the most (Alonso-Borrego
and Aguirregabiria 1999) Moreover, the use of fixed-
term contracts for some workers might strengthen
the bargaining position of permanent workers
because there is a buffer of temporary workers that
will be laid off first in the face of adverse economic
conditions. This stronger bargaining position might
result in higher wages for permanent workers and
lower employment rates relative to the case of no
reform (Bentolila and Dolado 1994).
Similarly, the findings that dismissal costs exact
large costs on labor market performance have
elicited a search for better suited alternatives to
protect workers against the risk of unemployment.
Proposals have included unemployment insurance
savings accounts (UISAs), traditional unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) programs as found in most
developed countries, and some hybrid systems pro-
viding a combination of UISAs and traditional UI.
Traditional UI systems have well-known moral haz-
ard problems. Insured workers have fewer incentives
to search effectively for jobs, thus extending the
duration of unemployment, although such effects
can be minimized with benefits that decline with
the duration of unemployment. In Latin American
countries, however, the most difficult implementa-
tion problem is the lack of appropriate records and
the large percentage of workers employed in unreg-
ulated jobs. This situation implies that workers can
easily work in the unregulated sectors while receiv-
ing UI payments.21 In this context, UISAs look
promising because they require only setting individ-
ual saving accounts to which workers contribute
when employed and draw from when unemployed.
Since workers own the funds, they will have the
right incentives to search for jobs or withdraw
resources from the account, thereby minimizing the
moral hazard problems associated with UI. However,
UISAs do not allow for risk pooling, forcing each84 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
tice or whether their benefits outweigh their costs.
It should be mentioned that in Chile the introduc-
tion of such a system was not associated with a
large reduction of the severance pay system (which
is much more generous than the UI system). 
This discussion should not be interpreted as a call
for inaction. On the contrary, only by experimenting
with new designs and proposals and evaluating their
results is it possible to achieve labor policies that max-
imize the benefits while minimizing the costs. This
approach is a more promising direction for reforms. 
worker to save for unemployment spells that may
not occur. Given the advantages and problems of
these two systems, it is easy to see why some coun-
tries are experimenting with mixed systems. For
example, a new unemployment insurance system in
Chile is based on UISA, but workers and the state
also contribute to a solidarity fund, which pays UI to
those workers whose savings are below a certain
minimum. These hybrid systems are promising.
However, they have not yet been evaluated, and
therefore it is unclear whether they work in prac-
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